Holliday v. Rain and Hail Services reinforces the idea that in this state, we really do allow companies to void insurance contracts for fraud or misrepresentation. According to the opinion, the Hollidays purchased crop insurance from the defendants. As is logical, rates and the benefits for lost crops are derived on an estimate of the crops' value, based on yields from prior years. But the Hollidays didn't report these values accurately:
"During the 1998 planting season, the Hollidays had yet to harvest their 1997 crops. Some of those crops remained unharvested into the summer and fall of 1998. Crops on four of the Hollidays’ farms in Wayne County that were planted in 1997 were never harvested in 1997. Nor did the Hollidays plant crops on those farms in 1998. Notwithstanding these facts, in March 1998 the Hollidays certified 1997 yields on two of these farms although they did not harvest crops on those farms and made no appraisals of their yields.
In June 1998, the Hollidays submitted acreage reports in which they certified their 1998 planting dates. In these reports, the Hollidays certified that they had planted crops on the Wayne County farms when in fact they had not done so. In addition, testimony from eyewitnesses disputed the planting dates certified by the Hollidays on eight other farms."
So they showed an artificially high amount of crops, causing their harvest to be overinsured, and as the court indicates they were "unable to produce records to support their claim of a potential yield loss they reported to Rain and Hail for the 1998 crop year." The insurerer voided the policy for intentional concealment or misrepresentation of material facts. The Hollidays sued. The Court upheld the verdict for the insurer.
An odd side note, this quote struck me as humorous: "Rain and Hail L.L.C. (Rain and Hail) is the managing general agent for CIGNA Property and Casualty Insurance Company (CIGNA). (Hereinafter we refer to Rain and Hail and CIGNA collectively as Rain and Hail unless otherwise indicated.)"
Ummm, yeah. That's so much more efficient than referring to them as, like, CIGNA.
State v. Reinders examines a consent to search issue. In last week's State v. McConnelee case, which I blogged on here, the issue was consent to searching a vehicle in a routine traffic stop in which the officer observed a "leafy material" on the console. The officer determined that it was, as the defendant had indicated, tobacco. However, the officer then proceeded to search the rest of the car and found a marijuana pipe in the console between the front seats, and baggies containing green, leafy plant material, baggies containing a white powdery substance, a baggy containing a white powder residue, a large digital scale, and other drug paraphernalia in a black back on the passenger seat. The issue was whether the permission to check the leafy substance, combined with a gesture toward the car, was in fact permission to search the entire car. NOTE: there was a side claim that the defendant had verbally said the officer could search the whole car, but the videotape didn't clearly show that. The court found that the scope was limited, and the search illegal.
In this week's Reinders case, Urbandale officers stopped the defendant because he'd been wandering around Hickman Road at about 2:30 in the morning. He didn't seem to be jogging, all the businesses were closed, and there had been a string of break-ins in the area. So the officers stop to chat. He gives them a false name. When asked whether he has any weapons, the defendant admits to having a kitchen knife, and starts to get it out of his back pocket. Officer Meskimen tells him to stop, that the officer will kindly remove it for him with his permission. The defendant gave permission. Officer Meskimen took out the knife, and "since Reinders had consented to a search of his pockets, Meskimen reached in a second time and pulled out some foil that contained a powdery substance later identified as methamphetamine." While Officer Pettit maintained the defendant had given specific permission for a continued search, Officer Meskimen and Officer Dobbins' statements seemed to contradict that.
In this circumstance, the Court upheld the search:
"The defendant contends he did not consent to a search of his person. He argues Officer Meskimen told the defendant that Meskimen would remove the knife, and the defendant then raised his arms to facilitate the officer’s retrieval of the knife. But the testimony of all three officers was to the contrary. Although their recollections varied as to whether Officer Meskimen asked the defendant if he could search the defendant before or after removing the knife from Reinders’ pocket, they all testified Meskimen asked for permission to search the defendant and the defendant gave the requested permission. The district court found this testimony to be credible and we defer to that court’s assessment. Therefore, we, like the district court, conclude the defendant consented to the search of his pocket. Consequently, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the warrantless search."
So it appears the distinction is in the permission. In one case, the defendant gave permission to check the leafy substance, not permission to search the car. The officer took that as permission to, among other things, search through a bag in the passenger's seat. In the other case, the defendant apparently gave a non-specific, blanket permission to search him, which the officers interpreted a tad more broadly than he would have wished.
Finally, State v. Smith provides insight into the bane in the of a defense attorney: stupid clients. Of course, the bane for the rest of us could be people who trust felons not to be stupid.
What happened? The defendant showed up for his OWI 3rd sentencing. He must have been told this is a felony. He must have been advised there was an extremely good, 99% chance he was going to prison, or at least jail, that afternoon. He was supposed to have made all his arrangements and be prepared to go. So he's sentenced and, no surprise, he gets prison time. In Iowa, sentences start immediately. Instead of forcing the defendant to wait, summoning a sheriff to drag him handcuffed out of court, the judge allows the defendant to walk to the jail in the company of his attorney. It's a non-violent crime, so while in hindsight it was a lousy idea, it's not a heinous or uncommon thing to do. They start downstairs, but the lawyer is summoned to another hearing - immediately. He takes his client over to the court attendant, and asks the attendant to call a deputy to escort the defendant, sinch he has to go. He heads into the courtroom, and the defendant walks away.
Eventually, someone catches him and he's charged with Escape. His arguments? Well, he had two. The first one actually had some merit - he claimed that his lawyer and the court attendant weren't officials as under the meaning of the law, and he wasn't physically restrained, so he wasn't "in custody" in the first place. The Court disagreed: "The court’s order, however, ordered Smith to report to the sheriff, a “public officer” “to whom the person has been entrusted.” Smith would have been subject to immediate physical restraint at the time he fled, and therefore, for purposes of the escape statute, he was in custody under the Breitbach test." The second argument is much more, um, creative. In fact, the Court said:
"Smith’s second argument surely must be tongue-in-cheek. He argues that the district court, in the earlier OWI case, had abused its discretion by allowing Smith to be accompanied from the courthouse by his lawyer, and this somehow justified his escape."
To echo the sentiments of the opinion: nice try.
You took advantage of the misplaced kindness of the court, and you've added another serious charge to your record, particularly one that will basically guarantee the increase of pre-trial bail to new financial stratospheres. Congratulations, dude.
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