Crouse v. Iowa Orthopedic Center and Davidson v. Hurst reiterate the position of the court that when it comes to the whole statute of limitations thing and time for service deadlines, they're serious. Really, really serious. I'm not sure what claimant counsel was thinking on these.
State v. Thomas clarifies further the prosecutorial misconduct rules on closing:
. . . [i]n response to defense counsel’s closing argument, the prosecutor said, “Quite honestly what counsel is telling you is a bill of goods and it is not credible.” We agree that use of the phrase “bill of goods” conveys the idea that opposing counsel was engaged in deception and that this was misconduct. . . . Additionally, it was clearly misconduct for the prosecutor to assert that opposing counsel was “not credible.” . . . the misconduct was one isolated statement during closing arguments. The State’s case against defendant was strong. Defendant was found trespassing. Crack cocaine was found on defendant’s person. Marijuana, a gun, and a knife were found in close proximity to the location where defendant was found hiding. We conclude the misconduct was not prejudicial and defendant’s due process rights were not violated. Having determined there was no prejudice caused by the misconduct, we also conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object to the misconduct.
On a side note, in reading between the lines, the trial must have been quite contentious. Listen to this other point brought up for consideration:
The first incident involved the prosecutor’s use of the personal pronoun “I” in her closing argument. . . After reviewing the transcript of the closing argument we determine the prosecutor in this case did not create evidence, interject personal beliefs, vouch for defendant’s guilt, or vouch for a witness’s credibility. We agree with the State that the prosecutor’s use of personal pronouns were simply instances of the prosecutor clarifying her statements, organizing her thoughts, using common expressions, employing rhetorical crutches, or responding to personal attacks leveled by defense counsel. Furthermore, we conclude that the prosecutor correctly recited the evidence in the record, did not express a basis of knowledge gained outside of the trial, and did not prejudice the defendant with any inappropriate uses of personal pronouns. Defendant’s claim that an objection should have been made is without merit and counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue.
I wonder what was with the whole "responding to personal attacks leveled by defense counsel" thing? This sounds way more interesting than most of the trials that have been televised.
Union Insurance Company v. Morlock:
After a home insured by Union Insurance Company caught fire while a painter was using a blowtorch to remove old paint, Union paid the homeowners’ claim and brought this action against the painter’s estate and business. After an adverse judgment of $478,177.63, the defendants appeal, arguing neither the facts nor the law supports the damage award. We affirm.
Question to defendants - weren't you guys paying attention back when the Old Capitol Dome burned down?
State v. Whipple is a typical shotgun ineffective assistance appeal:
The police department contacted the car’s registered owner and determined that Whipple’s girlfriend, Stacey Schara, with whom he resided, was the principal driver of the car. At about 1:20 a.m. investigating officers went to Schara’s residence and spoke with Whipple and Schara about the accident. Whipple gave officers conflicting versions of his activities on the night before. He initially told officers that he left Schara’s car at a school, but later said that he left it at a restaurant. Whipple also told officers that he arrived at Schara’s house at 9:30 p.m., but subsequently changed the time of arrival to 1:30 a.m. Whipple admitted to officers that he had a few beers that night. Officer Jeffrey Buckles noted and later testified Whipple had an odor of alcoholic beverages on his breath and his eyes were watery. Officer Gina Johnson of the Davenport Police Department noted and later testified Whipple smelled of alcohol, his eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was slightly slurred, and he appeared unsteady on his feet. After he was taken into custody and transported to the police station, Whipple screamed obscenities, was belligerent, and refused to take a breath test. Officers subsequently determined Whipple’s driver’s license was suspended effective 12:01 a.m. on November 14, 2003.
Whipple . . . testified that he was driving Schara’s car and that the accident occurred at around 11:00 p.m. on November 13, 2003. He also testified that he walked from the scene of the accident to Schara’s house and that he consumed three alcoholic drinks before police officers arrived to question him.
The jury didn't buy it. The Court of Appeals didn't either, finding the evidence sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Whipple was guilty of both OWI and driving while suspended.
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