The latest rulings from the Iowa Appellate Court have been posted here today.



This ruling in State v. Moorman is interesting when juxtaposed with the prior ruling of the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Morris.



The facts in State v. Moorman:

"The charges stem from the theft of a 1999 Chrysler Sebring belonging to Gloria Bowker. Just after midnight, James Cook, Gloria’s son, borrowed the car to go to a convenience store. At the store, Cook left the car running with the keys in the ignition while he shopped. Exiting the store he found the car was gone. He called his parents and reported the car as stolen. Later that morning, sheriff’s deputies on patrol saw a Chrysler Sebring approach them and, on checking the car’s license number, they discovered it was stolen. The deputies turned their vehicle around and followed the car. They saw the defendant stop the car at a convenience store, get out of the car, and enter the store. One deputy approached the defendant in the store and asked him to step outside. When the defendant asked why, the deputy said the car the defendant had been driving was stolen. The defendant denied having driven the car."



The ruling: "The court instructed the jury the State had to prove the defendant knew the automobile had been stolen. A jury may infer a defendant’s knowledge property is stolen from evidence of a defendant’s unexplained possession of recently stolen property. State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144, 146 (Iowa 1968); Stephen, 537 N.W.2d at 794. We conclude the defendant cannot establish the prejudice prong of his claim counsel was ineffective. Given the evidence presented by the State, the jury reasonably could find the defendant knew the automobile was stolen."



The facts of the Morris case:

"On October 6, 2001, at 4:30 a.m., Brian Gonzales started the engine on his truck parked on the street in front of his home. He intended to let it warm up before driving to work. Gonzales reentered his home leaving the engine running. Shortly thereafter, he heard a “revving” of the truck’s engine, looked outside, and saw someone driving his truck away. Gonzales called Waterloo police and reported the taking of the vehicle. Officer Aaron McClelland arrived at the scene and took the necessary information from Gonzales, including a description of the truck. The officer then put out an “attempt to locate” call to Waterloo patrol officers for the location of a brown Ford Ranger pickup truck. Approximately thirty minutes later, McClelland came upon the missing truck about five miles from Gonzales’s residence. The truck was being driven in the opposite direction from that of the officer’s vehicle. McClelland turned his police vehicle around and gave pursuit. The person driving Gonzales’s truck stopped the vehicle, got out, and fled on foot toward nearby houses. Officer McClelland radioed for backup and a K-9 unit responded. One of the dogs alerted police to the presence of a person hiding on a porch of a house. McClelland identified this person as the man who had fled from the truck. That person was ultimately determined to be defendant, Willis Elbert Morris."



The Ruling:

"Although apprehension of the suspect within a short time of the taking of the vehicle does not defeat the possibility that there was an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property at the time of the taking, it is a circumstance that severely limits the circumstantial evidence from which that intent can be inferred. The State urges that the circumstances under which the defendant abandoned the vehicle, i.e., stopping it and running away, are indicative of the requisite intent. We disagree. Abandoning the vehicle and fleeing upon observing the presence of police was an act that would ordinarily assure that the truck would be returned to its owner. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for second-degree theft."



See my earlier postings here and here, and the Tusk and Talon posting here)



Would the defendant in Moorman have done better to ditch the car and run like the Morris defendant? On the surface, it looks like enough to make your head spin, but the difference is in the code section charged. Theft is defined in the Iowa Code in Section 714.1. Degrees of theft are then outlined based on the value of the goods and services taken.



The code section charged in Moorman was 714.1(4):

4. Exercises control over stolen property, knowing such property to have been stolen, or having reasonable cause to believe that such property has been stolen, unless the person's purpose is to promptly restore it to the owner or to deliver it to an appropriate public officer. The fact that the person is found in possession of property which has been stolen from two or more persons on separate occasions, or that the person is a dealer or other person familiar with the value of such property and has acquired it for a consideration which is far below its reasonable value, shall be evidence from which the court or jury may infer that the person knew or believed that the property had been stolen.



The section charged in Morris was 714.1(1):

1. Takes possession or control of the property of another, or property in the possession of another, with the intent to deprive the other thereof. "



I still disagree with the ruling in Morris because I believe there was sufficient evidence for the jury as the finder of fact in our legal system to infer an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the car. But this is a lesson to the prosecutor that I learned rather early on myself: Always charge as many code sections as fit. You can always drop one out or refine it later.