CLINKSCALES v. NELSON SECURITIES, INC.
FACTS:
The facts on this one are rather dramatic, so I'll just quote the Court verbatim:
Late one Friday afternoon in the summer of 2002, James Clinkscales went to The Gallery Lounge, a Davenport pub. Approximately fifty people were there. Clinkscales, an active-duty marine in town as a recruiter, stationed himself at the bar next to a blonde woman known only as “Dimples.” The two began to share a pitcher of beer together.
(Side note: Dimples? Seriously??? Does it occur to anyone that this doesn't sound like a promising start to a Friday night?)
On Fridays in the summer, The Gallery regularly grilled hamburgers outside and served them to its customers. The grill stood directly outside of the bar on a patio ten feet away from where Clinkscales and Dimples sat. Two tanks of propane gas placed underneath the grill fueled it. The grill was custom-made and large enough to grill twenty burgers at a time.
The Gallery employed Joe Moser to grill the burgers. The first batch of burgers Moser placed on the grill that evening were particularly greasy. When Moser flipped them over, a fire flared up on the grill. Moser did not consider this to be a problem. All of a sudden, however, Moser heard something abnormal—“a pop and a hiss.” A ball of fire erupted underneath the grill and engulfed the propane tanks.
Caroline Nelson co-owns The Gallery with her husband and regularly works there. When the fire started Nelson was standing at the patio door. Moser told Nelson to get a fire extinguisher. Nelson and Moser testified Nelson and other Gallery employees made general announcements to the patrons to leave and then one employee called the fire department. Clinkscales testified he was alerted to the fire when he saw Nelson come into the bar looking for a fire extinguisher, but did not believe Nelson said anything to him or anybody else about what was happening.
Nelson came back outside with a fire extinguisher and gave it to a patron. The patron extinguished the flame, and Moser managed to turn the knobs on the grill to the “off” position. Moser could still smell gas escaping from the tanks, however, and Moser said aloud that he wanted to shut the tanks off. Moser pulled the grill away from a wall to access the tanks, but he found the valves were too hot to touch. There were customers in the patio and adjacent bar. Clinkscales came out to the patio and asked a man holding a fire extinguisher if anyone had turned the gas off. The man told Clinkscales the handle was too hot.
Clinkscales, who had received extensive training in fire suppression in the military, recognized the situation was “very dangerous.” Clinkscales took off his shirt, wrapped it around one of hands, and turned the gas off. No one asked Clinkscales to do so. He reacted instinctively:[I]t’s like running after a kid when he runs into the street, you don’t think about it, that there’s a car coming, you just try to grab the child, and, you know, hope for the best. You could get killed doing it, but you just do it.
(Side note: I'm not so sure I buy this. Instinct is a sudden, quick reaction with no time for thought. This required him to examine the valves, take off his shirt, wrap it around his arm, and so on. But that's a jury issue.)
As Clinkscales was turning off the gas, the fire flared up. Clinkscales was burned on his face, neck, chest, arms, and legs.
Skin hanging from his arms, Clinkscales continued his rescue efforts by helping a frightened young woman in the patio over a fence. A frequent patron of the bar, a man named Norm, took Clinkscales to the hospital just as the fire department arrived.
PROCEDURE:
The way the case came to the Court is important on this one. The plaintiff first alleged that The Gallery should be liable for his injuries due to negligence, because it 1) failed to properly design, manufacture, maintain, and operate the grill, 2) did not adequately train its employees in the use and maintenance of the grill, 3) did not have enough fire suppression equipment and did not properly use the fire extinguishers it did have, 4) did not have emergency procedures in place necessary to protect its customers. Theoretically, if he could prove any of those were more likely than not true (51% burden of proof), then he could recover for his injuries. Also, the plaintiff pled res ipsa loquitur, contending that even if he could not prove the precise cause of the mishap, the defendants had exclusive control over the instrumentalities involved in the fire and the injuries to him would not have happened unless negligence - the lack of reasonable care - had occurred.
(Side note for non lawyers: res ipsa loquitur translates to "the thing speaks for itself." It is trying to prove negligence circumstantially, when no direct evidence of negligence might exist, or the plaintiff might have no memory of the incident in which he or she was injured. It allows the plaintiff to make the claim that (1) the injury is caused by an instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant, and (2) the occurrence is such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used. Therefore, the loss must have been caused by the defendant's negligence. The defendant can, of course, rebut this circumstantial evidence by showing the defendant did use reasonable care.)
As the case went on, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
(Another side note for non-lawyers: summary judgment is proper in a case when there is no genuine issue of material fact (everybody agrees what happened on the important points), and under the law as it applies with these undisputed facts there is no way the plaintiff can recover. It's a short-cut that allows a non-meritorious case to get knocked out before trial. If a case gets tossed on summary judgment, the appellate courts are supposed to look at the facts in the light most favorable to the party who lost, and see if there's any way they could've made their case under the law. If there is, then the case should be reinstated and go to the jury for a decision.)
The Court noted what the lower courts had found:
. . . [T]he district court found employees of The Gallery told Clinkscales to evacuate the premises; there was no evidence there was imminent risk to life when he turned off the gas; and “a reasonable person would not determine that the benefits of approaching a fire outweigh the risk of being seriously burned or injured.” The district court ruled the defendants were not liable because (1) Clinkscales’s injuries were caused by a known and obvious danger and (2) the defendants’ alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of Clinkscales’s injuries. The court also concluded res ipsa loquitur was not applicable because grease fires can occur without negligence. The court of appeals affirmed. It declined to apply the rescue doctrine and held, as a matter of law, Clinkscales “suffers from a self-inflicted wound.”
ANALYSIS
The Court first analyzed whether there was any way the plaintiff could prove that negligence had caused his injuries.
It first noted Iowa has a theory called the "rescue doctrine":
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer. . . . The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.
The rescue doctrine usually turns on the issue of whether the defendant's negligence caused the defendant's injuries, or whether the intervening cause of the plaintiff's actions supercedes the negligence of the defendant. In other words, the defendant argues that whether or not they did anything wrong, the plaintiff wouldn't have gotten hurt but for his or her own actions in putting him/herself in harm's way, and so he or she really caused his or her own injuries. The Court noted:
The Gallery asserts the facts show its employees ordered patrons to leave the premises, it had called the fire department, and at the time of the rescue attempt Moser was retrieving a rag to turn off the propane valves. The court of appeals held as a matter of law that the rescue doctrine did not apply in this case because “no one was in any danger until the plaintiff placed himself there.”
However, the Court refuted that point by stating that:
It is well settled that questions of proximate cause are, absent extraordinary circumstances, for the jury to decide. . . The rescue doctrine recognizes not all intervening forces are superseding causes:If the actor’s negligent conduct threatens harm to another’s person, land, or chattels, the normal efforts of the other or a third person to avert the threatened harm are not a superseding cause of harm resulting from such efforts.
We think the facts are sufficiently in conflict on the issue of proximate cause to warrant a jury determination. . . .
While it is undisputed employees of The Gallery called the fire department and asked some patrons to evacuate, a jury could find Clinkscales’s rescue efforts were a normal or natural reaction under the circumstances. He may have reasonably thought danger was imminent and, given his extensive training, his help was needed. Exhortations to leave do not, as a matter of law, preclude liability in all cases. If a defendant sets into course a series of events that induces a rescue attempt, the defendant does not necessarily insulate itself from liability when it tells the rescuer to leave. In any event, in this case there is evidence no one effectively ordered Clinkscales to leave, and some evidence The Gallery enlisted the help of other customers to fight the fire. There is nothing inconsistent with an express general call to evacuate and an implicit individual invitation to help. Even if we were to assume Clinkscales was told to leave, however, this would be but one fact for the jury to consider in evaluating his rescue attempt.
The Court next examined the "open and obvious" defense, which basically says that even if the negligence of the defendant did create a dangerous condition for the plaintiff, the condition was so obvious that the plaintiff had to have known about it, and basically should have known better. Generally, even when the defendant landowner has asked someone to be on their property for a business purpose (as opposed to, like, a trespasser), they are not liable when the injuries sustained were caused by a known or obvious danger. But the Court found that the open and obvious principle is modified in situations of a rescue:
Fire and escaping gas is obviously dangerous. That is not in doubt. This is not your garden-variety premises liability case, however—it involves an attempted rescue. Absent imminent danger or the appearance thereof, the rescue doctrine is not applicable. . . . To rule the presence of a known and obvious dangerous condition would, as a matter of law, negate any duty to invitee-rescuers would completely eviscerate the rescue doctrine where the rescuer happened to be an invitee of the defendant when the condition first occurred.
Having decided that if the restaurant was negligent, the defendant did have a shot at proving the negligence was the cause of his injuries, the Court then addressed the question of whether the defendant could prove the restaurant was negligent in the first place. The Court first addressed the issue of whether the plaintiff could straight up prove the restaurant was negligent:
The district court ruled the defendants were not negligent, as a matter of law, because they asked patrons to leave, called the fire department, and used fire extinguishers. The defendants also point out they have operated the grill for fifteen years without incident and took “precautions to ensure the utmost safety.”
We cannot say as a matter of law that The Gallery was not negligent as alleged in Clinkscales’s petition. Questions of negligence are ordinarily reserved for the jury, and only in extraordinary cases is summary judgment proper. . . . There is testimony the defendants did not clean the grill regularly or sufficiently train their employees in grill cleaning. For example, one of the hoses leading from the propane tanks to the grill had a small “burn hole” in it. There is also evidence Moser permitted the grease fire to persist too long, at times unattended, until it became too large to contain. A jury could also find the defendants did not keep the appropriate type of fire suppression equipment near the grill. A jury should decide whether The Gallery was negligent, and whether this negligence caused the grill fire, subsequent gas leak, and injuries to Clinkscales.
Finally, the Court examined the res ipsa loquitur claim. The question was whether the doctrine applied here, given that grease fires can and did often occur even when reasonable care has been taken. The Court indicated that the focus of the argument was wrong - the grease fire wasn't the cause or occurrence at issue:
The issue in this case is not simply whether a grease fire could happen in the exercise of ordinary care, because the “occurrence” in this case was not just a grease fire. After all, when Clinkscales approached the grill, the fire was extinguished. The problem was that gas was leaking from the propane tanks, and it appeared reignition of the fire might prove disastrous. Moser testified he heard an abnormal “pop and hiss” come from the grill before the grease fire spread to the tanks. We have repeatedly held the res ipsa loquitur doctrine may be applicable in gas leak cases.
RULING
Based on all this, the Court held that Because a jury could find the bar’s negligence proximately caused the marine’s rescue attempt and injuries, the district court decision should be reversed, the court of appeals opinion vacated, and the case remanded for a trial on the merits.
OBLIGATORY BLOG COMMENTARY:
Given the doctrine as they outlined it, they're right in applying it to preclude summary judgment here. It's an issue for the jury. I've still got my questions on whether it will be found to be negligence or not. It reminded me somewhat of this earlier, far more frivolous case:
WINKERS V. PENINSULA GAMING CO.
I blogged on this case back in September, and got a mention on Overlawyered about it.
FACTS
"On or about December 31, 2001, John Winkers and Linda Munz drove to the Diamond Jo Casino. They parked in a parking lot owned by the City of Dubuque. At this same time, Jeffrey Howell, a parking valet for the casino, noticed a man had fallen out of his wheelchair in the parking lot.[1] Howell attempted to lift the man, who weighed about 200 pounds, but could not do so. Howell asked Winkers and Munz, who were walking by at this time, to help him, and they agreed. After several attempts, Howell and Winkers were able to lift the man, while Munz held the wheelchair steady. Winkers and Munz then proceeded into the casino, where they spent several hours gambling.
On July 15, 2002, Winkers and Munz filed suit against Peninsula Gaming Company, doing business as Diamond Jo Casino, alleging they were both injured while helping the man into his wheelchair. They claimed the casino was negligent in (1) failing to provide safe premises; (2) failing to properly train employees on proper procedures when dealing with a fallen or intoxicated patron; (3) failing to follow proper procedure in asking plaintiffs for assistance; and (4) failing to report the incident in a timely fashion. They also raised claims based on theories of respondeat superior and dram shop liability."
RULING
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of the claim on summary judgment:
On appeal, plaintiffs allege they became temporary employees of the casino under the emergency employment doctrine. . . . when an employee, with the knowledge of the employer, seeks assistance in an emergency, the one assisting may be entitled to the same protection as other employees . . . Plaintiffs failed to preserve error on this argument because they did not raise it before the district court. We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. . . .
In addition to the absence of a relationship that will support a duty, public policy doesn’t favor the plaintiffs. The only act of Mr. Howell which the plaintiffs can identify as being blameworthy is the act of asking them to assist him in helping the fallen man. Iowa has not yet reached the point where the act of asking others to help the less fortunate is actionable. . . .
Plaintiffs voluntarily agreed to assist Howell. We note . . . "if a person as a mere volunteer attempts to assist the servant of another the master of the servant owes the volunteer no duty . . . .”
We conclude plaintiffs have failed to show the first element of a negligence claim, the existence of a duty. We conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant.
(For nonlawyers: Landowners have a duty to protect people who enter onto their property from dangerous conditions. The extent of the duty depends to some degree on whether the person is there because they were invited, or whether the person was a trespasser. But still, there is some level of duty to protect people on your land. That's why the Clinkscales case didn't really go into the whole "duty" analysis so much. But in Munz, Peninsula was not the landowner. The City of Dubuque was. So the issue became whether Peninsula had a duty to protect its patrons from this particular harm that occurred on someone else's land. In my brain, I analogize it to trying to hold one neighbor liable because you tripped in the other neighbor's sidewalk, or holding your friends liable because you got into a car accident on the way to pick them up. They have no control over the way the streets or sidewalk are run, no duty to keep them up, and no duty to you to make sure you get to their house safely.)
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