FACTS:
"In the early hours of May 19, 1986, Des Moines police responded to a domestic disturbance at the apartment of Defendant and Ms. Sheets. The apartment was virtually demolished. Broken furniture was strewn about. The walls were smeared with blood and peppered with holes. Defendant, soaked in his victim’s blood, was yelling scripture and kicking and pouncing on the nude, spread-eagled body of Ms. Sheets when police arrived. It took five officers to subdue Defendant, who continued to chant variations of the verse from John 3:16.
Ms. Sheets had been struck, kicked, bitten, and strangled. She suffered a lacerated liver, bite marks of the head and neck, a crushed upper and lower jaw, and a brain hemorrhage in addition to the numerous contusions, lacerations and abrasions of the body, face, and throat. Dirt was found in her vagina which Defendant had repeatedly kicked. He had bitten off her nose and gouged out her eyes. He had scooped blood from the sockets and smeared it over the doorway in some reference to Passover. These injuries were inflicted antemortem.
Two other assaults, also shocking, predated Huss’s attack on Sheets. In 1981, Huss—then eighteen years old—received a suspended sentence for second-degree robbery after committing a brutal, late-night assault on a woman in a parking lot. The victim was found unconscious, her clothes torn from her body, with multiple wounds including severe injuries to her eyes. A year later, Huss and several companions gang-raped a teenage girl. Huss, who was arrested at the scene, pleaded guilty to third-degree sex abuse. His prior probation was revoked and his ten-year sentence ordered to be served concurrently with his robbery conviction. It was while on parole for these convictions that he murdered Marilyn Sheets.
According to psychiatric experts who examined Huss following the Sheets murder, Huss’s pre- and post-assault behaviors were symptomatic of the onset and culmination of bipolar affective disorder in manic phase: Huss had tried out for the Iowa Cubs, envisioning himself as a major league baseball player; he planned a gambling trip to Las Vegas as a way of earning money to feed Des Moines’ homeless; his thinking and speech patterns were disorganized and marked by hyperreligiosity and hypersexuality; and he was dehydrated and weak after the killing. Based on the prior assaults, Huss was also diagnosed with an Axis II antisocial personality disorder."
PROCEDURE:
This case is a procedural nightmare, and I'm going to pull language freely from both the current opinion and the prior opinion freely, so as not to mistate. Consider them both attributed.
By the end of 1986, Huss’ mental illness went into remission and the case went forward. The State and defense counsel both agreed that he was insane at the time of the killings. Anticipating a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, they submitted the case on stipulated facts and agreed to a bench trial.
Contrary to the parties’ expectations, the court found that Huss had not established his insanity defense. In order that he not be prejudiced by his jury waiver, the court agreed to set the matter for jury trial on the merits of the murder charge.
The jury convicted him of first degree murder. He appealed based on an argument that the trial was essentially double jeopardy, but the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the conviction. State v. Huss, 430 N.W.2d 621, 624-25 (Iowa 1998). Huss also sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
"The federal district court denied that request, but the court of appeals determined that a retrial to a jury of the issues originally submitted for determination at the bench trial violated the double jeopardy protection of the federal constitution. Huss v. Graves, 252 F.3d 952, 958 (8th Cir. 2001). The court further determined, however, that, because the bench trial had been aborted without a decision on the merits, the matter could be resubmitted for a second bench trial on the same record made at the first bench trial. Id."
The second bench trial resulted in a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, which triggered a required civil commitment hearing under Rule 2.22(8) of the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure.
That hearing resulted in a finding by the district court that Huss was currently dangerous and should be committed for treatment of a bipolar disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and other dangerous mental traits.
On an appeal from the finding of not guilty by reason of insanity and the subsequent civil commitment, the Iowa Supreme Court struck down an effort to reassert a double-jeopardy challenge based on the second bench trial. State v. Huss, 657 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2003). However, it found that the evidence that had been presented at the rule 2.22(8) hearing was insufficient because of the absence of a recent overt act. So it reversed the district court’s civil commitment order. In doing so, the Court said:
We are not unsympathetic to the district court’s expressed concern that Huss’s history “portends a future fraught with danger to women” if he is released. Indeed, Huss himself appears to share the same concern over his troubled past and the unpredictability of his illness. But, as this court observed in Stark, “it is a violation of due process for a state to confine a harmless, mentally ill person.” 550 N.W.2d at 469. By all accounts, Huss’s mental disorder has been in remission for years. The record emphatically establishes that, despite a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, Huss has posed no harm to anyone for seventeen years. He has gotten along well with others whether confined in the penitentiary or the mental hospital.
But . . .
In the meantime, at about the point when Huss filed his federal habeas petition, the State began proceedings to commit Huss as a sexually violent predator. The Anamosa correctional facility gave written notice that Huss may meet the definition of a sexually violent predator. A multidisciplinary team was convened and determined that Huss met the definition of a sexually violent predator. The multidisciplinary team so notified the attorney general. On October 16, 2001, the AG then filed the petition to commit Huss. The district court made a preliminary determination of probable cause on and set it for formal hearing. A formal hearing resulted in a renewed determination of probable cause, and the court, at the State’s request, ordered Huss to submit to a psychological examination by the State’s designated expert. The attorney general’s petition for Huss’s commitment was then held in abeyance pending the conclusion of his second bench trial and the mandatory civil commitment hearing.
Huss refused to submit to a psychological evaluation by the State’s designated expert. He also filed the first of his motions to dismiss. In the meantime, the district court ruled that, as a sanction for Huss’s refusal to submit to a psychological examination, the elements that the State had to prove at the section 229A.7(1) hearing and at the final hearing under section 229A.7(2) would be deemed to have been established – in essence, establishing the psychological components of a sexually violent predator. That ruling served as the foundation for an October 21, 2002 ruling granting the State’s motion for a summary judgment ordering Huss’s commitment as a sexually violent predator.
Huss’ appeal in the current case to the Supreme Court involved five arguments:
(1) That following the vacation of his conviction by the federal court of appeals, he was no longer in the legal custody of the Anamosa correctional facility;
(2) That the attorney general’s petition was prematurely filed;
(3) That the trial had not been held within ninety days of the probable-cause hearing as specified in Iowa Code section 229A.7(2);
(4) That the sexually violent predator hearing was essentially decided by the appeal on the civil commitment hearing – because there was no recent violent act, he couldn’t be considered a sexually violent predator; and
(5) That the state shouldn’t have essentially been given a default judgment based on the lack of a psychological examination.
THE CUSTODY ARGUMENT
Huss argued that because of the procedural position of his case at the time of the sexually violent predator filing, he should’ve been in the custody of the Polk County Sheriff and not the Anamosa correctional facility. Because under the statute only the agency with legal custody of a person in penal confinement may give notice of an impending discharge to the attorney general and the multidisciplinary team that led to the filing of the sexually violent predator committal proceedings, he felt that the petition which resulted from the notice was fatally flawed. The court found the giving of notice under section 229A.3(1) was not an essential step in the process for filing a petition: the notice provided is only intended to be a heads-up to an approaching discharge date, in case a determination to file a petition appears to be a possibility.
(2) Premature filing
Huss then argued that the filing of the attorney general’s petition was premature because it was done before he was found not guilty by reason of insanity, a ususal triggering event for such petitions. But the Court found that a NGRI is not the only triggering event for the filing of a petition under section 229A.4, all that is necessary for a section 229A.4(1) filing is a determination that “it appears that a person presently confined may be a sexually violent predator and the prosecutor’s review committee has determined that the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator . . . .”
(3) 90-day rule
The Court found that the psychological examination was a critical stage in the proceedings, and its absence would have substantially prejudiced the State, and justifies the action of the district court in delaying the final hearing beyond the 90-day time span required.
(4) Recent overt act
The Court found the existence of a recent overt act is not an essential requirement with respect to a petition for commitment as a sexually violent predator.
(5) The default judgment
This became the key issue on this appeal.
The sexually violent predator hearings are held under Iowa Code Section 299A.7:
229A.7 Trial, determination, commitment procedure, chapter 28E agreements, mistrials.
1. If the person charged with a sexually violent offense has been found incompetent to stand trial and the person is about to be released pursuant to section 812.5, or the person has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity, if a petition has been filed seeking the person's commitment under this chapter, the court shall first hear evidence and determine whether the person did commit the act or acts charged. At the hearing on this issue, the rules of evidence applicable in criminal cases shall apply, and all constitutional rights available to defendants at criminal trials, other than the right not to be tried while incompetent, shall apply. After hearing evidence on this issue, the court shall make specific findings on whether the person did commit the act or acts charged, the extent to which the person's incompetence or insanity affected the outcome of the hearing, including its effect on the person's ability to consult with and assist counsel and to testify on the person's own behalf, the extent to which the evidence could be reconstructed without the assistance of the person, and the strength of the prosecution's case. If after the conclusion of the hearing on this issue, the court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person did commit the act or acts charged, the court shall enter a final order, appealable by the person, on that issue, and may proceed to consider whether the person should be committed pursuant to this chapter.
2. Within ninety days after either the entry of the order waiving the probable cause hearing or completion of the probable cause hearing held under section 229A.5, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the respondent is a sexually violent predator. The respondent or the attorney for the respondent may waive the ninety-day trial requirement as provided in this section; however, the respondent or the attorney for the respondent may reassert a demand and the trial shall be held within ninety days from the date of filing the demand with the clerk of court. The trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the due administration of justice, and when the respondent will not be substantially prejudiced. In determining what constitutes good cause, the court shall consider the length of the pretrial detention of the respondent.
As for the exam, Iowa Code 229A.5(5) requires:
5. If the court determines that probable cause does exist, the court shall direct that the respondent be transferred to an appropriate secure facility for an evaluation as to whether the respondent is a sexually violent predator. The evaluation shall be conducted by a person deemed to be professionally qualified to conduct such an examination.
But Huss refused to undergo that examination, because he felt that it would be self-incriminatory. Basically, the sexually violent predator committal had a two-step process, 229A.7(1) bench trial on whether or not the person committed the sexually violent offense, and a 229A.7(2) bench or jury trial on whether the person should be committed as a sexually violent predator. Huss refused to undergo the evaluation because he felt it would incriminate him in the 229A.7(1) hearing, because if at the time the attorney general’s petition was filed, Huss was not being held for a sexually violent offense, then the petition was not authorized and he must be released.
The Court found that the trial court had entered a valid order requiring the exam, and sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders can result in having the point sought to be established by the order interpreted as proven against the party failing to comply. It noted that if Huss’s refusal to be examined was undertaken without any colorable excuse, the drastic sanction invoked by the district court would have been entirely proper as it pertained to the determination of his sexually violent predator status. It pointed out that it would likely be the only way the State could prove its case if he continued to refuse the evaluation.
But the Court then noted that Huss’s refusal was only temporary - he would consent to be examined following the section 229A.7(1) sexually violent predator hearing. The court then examined Huss’ assertion that the 229A.7(1) hearing could be dispositive of his case, and determined he got it wrong:
Having been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense is an element that the State must prove in order to successfully establish that a subject should be committed as a sexually violent predator. In the present case, as we have previously noted, this must have been in regard to the offense for which Huss was confined at the time the petition was filed. The hearing provided in section 229A.7(1) is a trial to the court. The final hearing at which it is to be determined whether the subject is a sexually violent predator contemplates a right to jury trial. We are persuaded that the critical issue of whether Huss was charged with a sexually violent offense is more properly to be determined at the final hearing under section 229A.7(2) wherein the right to jury trial is available. The right to jury trial would be substantially diluted if an important element in the determination of sexually violent predator status could be determined in a preliminary bench trial.
The Court solved the issue by reversing the committal order and remanding:
“We vacate the district court’s sanction order and also vacate the order granting summary judgment. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings, which shall include (1) establishing a time for Huss to be examined, (2) fixing a section 229A.7(1) hearing date, and (3) fixing a final hearing date that shall afford the parties sufficient time to request a trial by jury as provided in Iowa Code section 229A.7(3). The time for Huss’s psychological examination need not await the conclusion of the section 229A.7(1) hearing. All costs of appeal are assessed to the State.”
Keep in mind, this has all been going on since 1986. The title of this post comes from that old 80's song that just kept running through my head when I read this one: one way or another, I'm gonna find ya, I'm gonna get you get you get you get you . . .
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