THE FACTS:
In the early morning hours of August 31, 2002, Jesse Adams invited a group of people to attend an after hours party at a residence located in Eagle Grove, Iowa, after the bar they had previously been socializing at closed. Approximately twenty minutes after the party started, Schoo arrived at the residence. Upon entering the residence, Schoo walked into the living room and hit his ex-wife, Jamie. Immediately after the assault, Schoo fled from the residence.
Schoo was charged by trial information with first-degree burglary. A jury trial commenced on May 6, 2003. At trial, the theory of the defense was that Jesse consented, either expressly or impliedly, to Schoo’s presence at the party. The testimony given at trial was largely contradictory. Both of the bartenders who were working that night testified that Jesse made a general announcement to everyone remaining in the bar that he was having a party. Contrarily, Jesse denied making a general announcement and maintained he only invited the group of five friends with whom he was socializing. One of the bartenders testified Schoo came in at closing time to purchase a pack of cigarettes and could have heard Jesse make the announcement. None of the other witnesses remembered seeing Schoo at the bar that night.
The jury was only instructed on the charges of first-degree burglary, assault causing bodily injury, and simple assault because Schoo’s defense counsel requested certain lesser-included offenses be removed. The jury found Schoo guilty of first-degree burglary. He was subsequently sentenced to serve an indeterminate twenty-five year term.
The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction on the original burglary charge, stating:
“The jury was free to believe Jesse’s testimony that he did not make a general invitation to everyone left remaining in the bar and that he had not given Schoo permission to enter the residence. Likewise, the jury was free to disbelieve or attach less weight to the bartenders’ contrary testimony. Further, even assuming the jury believed Schoo had permission to attend the party, Jesse’s permission to enter was not for the purposes followed by Schoo. In this case, there was evidence Schoo walked into the party and immediately assaulted his ex-wife. This case is distinguishable from State v. King, 344 N.W.2d 562, 563 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983), where an initially cordial conversation turned into a dispute that led to an assault. Here, Schoo’s felonious intent could be inferred from his entry into the party and the short amount of time that elapsed before he committed the assault and his immediate retreat from the premises after the assault was completed. This permits the reasonable inference that Schoo did not enter for the permissible purpose of attending the party.”
The sequel to this little saga was played out in yesterday’s Iowa Supreme Court opinion in State v. Baker:
THE FACTS:
The day after the verdict was rendered, a juror (Krause) received a call from defendant Baker:
“that began with the caller’s question, “Is this Deb?” Because Krause and Baker had previously worked together, Krause recognized Baker’s voice, and caller ID confirmed the call was made from Baker’s telephone. When Krause responded that yes, she was Deb, the caller stated, “This is Rose.” The caller then asked Krause “if [she] knew that [she] gave him 25 years.” Krause understood Baker was referring to Schoo. Krause told Baker she did not know what sentence Schoo had received. Baker then stated: “Well, I just thought you should know you gave him 25 years,” and hung up the phone.
Krause notified law enforcement of Baker’s call. Although Krause did not feel threatened by Baker, she was bothered and upset by the call and Baker’s tone of voice. According to Krause, she “was in disbelief that [Baker] had called [her] to say that.” Krause said she “did not beg and plead to be one of the jurors,” and would rather not have been picked, but it was “something [she] had to do—whether [she] wanted to or not!”
Baker was charged with tampering with a juror in violation of Iowa Code section 720.4: “A person who . . . in retaliation for anything lawfully done by any witness or juror in any case, harasses such witness or juror, commits an aggravated misdemeanor.” Iowa Code § 720.4.
Baker filed an application for adjudication of law points, claiming:
(1) section 720.4 was unconstitutional as applied to her in this case as it violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
(2) section 720.4 was unconstitutional because the statute did not give fair notice that it prohibited harassment of an individual no longer sitting on a jury, rendering the statute vague in violation of the Due Process Clause.
The Court first analyzed whether the statute and it’s definition of harassment infringed on Baker’s free speech:
“This court has held that the term “harass” as used in section 720.4 means “harassment” as defined in Iowa Code section 708.7(1). State v. Reynolds, 670 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Iowa 2003).
The portion of section 708.7(1) pertinent to this case states:
A person commits harassment when, with intent to intimidate, annoy, or alarm another person, the person . . . [c]ommunicates with another by telephone, telegraph, writing, or via electronic communication without legitimate purpose, and in a manner likely to cause the other person annoyance or harm.
Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the statute does not prohibit speech that has a legitimate purpose. It only reaches communication that not only is “without legitimate purpose” and intended to “intimidate, annoy or alarm” the juror, but is done to retaliate for a lawful act of the juror in a court case. Id. Here there was clearly a jury question under the stipulated facts whether Baker contacted Krause to gather factual information about Krause’s knowledge and views of the sentencing system, or whether the contact was intended to intimidate or alarm Krause in retaliation for her role in convicting Schoo.
The real question here is whether the State can, consistently with the First Amendment, punish Baker for conduct that, while not consisting of threats or fighting words, could be found by a jury to be purposefully intimidating or alarming to a juror in retaliation for the juror’s lawful participation in the jury process. We conclude the statute does not violate the First Amendment for two reasons: (1) harassing conduct is not protected by the First Amendment; and (2) to the extent there is infringement on protected speech, such infringement is justified by the state interests at stake.”
The Court then turned to the vagueness issue:
“Turning first to the common meaning of the term, we find the dictionary defines “juror” as “1 a : one of a number of men sworn to deliver a verdict as a body : a member of a jury b : a person designated and summoned to service on a jury 2 : a person who takes oath esp. of allegiance.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1227 (unabr. ed. 2002). This definition does not clearly limit the term “juror” to a person actively or presently serving on a jury. That such a limitation would not be reasonable here is supported by the context of the statute and the legislative purpose underlying the adoption of section 720.4. The statute makes it a misdemeanor to retaliate for anything lawfully done by any juror in any case. Iowa Code § 720.4. The statute focuses on the role played by the victim in a court case without any temporal limitation. Furthermore, the most visible act taken by a juror and clearly the one most likely to generate retaliation is the verdict. In view of the purpose of the statute, it would seem odd indeed that its protection would cease at the very time this safeguard is most needed."
The Court concluded that the district court erred in holding the statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendant and dismissing the charge against her, and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Well, at least she'll get a jury trial on the intent issue. The moral of the story? Perhaps you should consider writing letters to the editor, or better yet, a blog. Just don’t call the jurors.
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