"[A]bsence of sexually predatory acts in a setting of secure confinement does not paint the same picture as the absence of such acts in a normal life situation. We have generally upheld the statutory scheme presented by Iowa Code chapter 229A against substantive due process challenges. See In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 282-83 (Iowa 2000)."
The second and third issue involved procedural stuff. The court reiterated that the requirement that the sheriff give 90-day notice to the attorney general prior to the expiration of the sentence of a person who's a candidate for this civil commitment proceeding is not a procedural due process right of the defendant. Instead, it's just supposed to allow the State a "heads up" that a petition could be filed. So the lack of the notice doesn't render the commital invalid. The court also addressed a quirky situation in this case: The jury found the guy guilty of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. The civil commitment was filed after the verdict but before sentencing. The defendant claimed that the commital petition was invalid because he hadn't been "convicted" per se at the time it was filed. The court's take: not so much.
The second case, IN RE THE DETENTION OF CAROL PALMER, is more complex, it involved the ability of the State's psychiatrist to testify to an arguably 'ultimate issue' question: "[W]ere you able to formulate an opinion as to a reasonable degree of professional certainty about whether the respondent’s pedophilia makes it likely that he will engage in predatory acts of a sexually-violent nature if he’s not confined in a secure facility?" The Court held that the State of Iowa is not a strict adherent to the ultimate issue rule, pointing out the Court's prior holding in Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942):
"There is no sound basis in law, reason, or common sense for decisions that a witness may state his opinion as to what “may,” “might,” “could,” or “probably did” cause something, but may not give an opinion as to that “did,” “will,” or “would,” cause it. The true rule is, and should be, that the witness may use such expression as voices his true state of mind on the matter, whether it be possibility, probability, or actuality. To insist that a witness confine his testimony to an expression of possibility or probability, when his real judgment or conviction is actuality, or fact, is unfair to the witness and the jury, and unjust to the party offering the testimony."
However, it indicated that the ruling did put limits on such testimony, again quoting Grismore:
"It should be received only as to such matters as are the proper subject of expert testimony. No witness should be permitted to give his opinion directly that a person is guilty or innocent, or is criminally responsible or irresponsible, or that a person was negligent or not negligent, or that he had capacity to execute a will or deed, or like instrument, or . . . whether [probable cause existed]. But the reason is that such matters are not subjects of opinion testimony. They are mixed questions of law and fact. When a standard, or a measure, or a capacity has been fixed by law, no witness whether expert or non-expert, nor however qualified, is permitted to express an opinion as to whether or not the person or the conduct, in question, measures up to that standard. On that question the court must instruct the jury as to the law, and the jury must draw its own conclusion from the evidence."
The Court then enters a close analysis of the question. I don't have the time to summarize, but I'll excerpt for brevity. (Yep. The stuff in the opinion is much longer. And you think my blog makes your brain bleed?):
The most troubling problem with questions and opinions couched in terms of legal standards and conclusions, and the primary underlying reason they are often inadmissible, is that they “may be misunderstood by the witness and the jury if they do not know the law’s definition of” the legal standards used. . . .
If there is a danger of the jury misunderstanding the legal terms used, not only may the opinion be excludable under rules 5.701 and 5.702 as being not helpful to the jury, but it may also be excludable under rule 5.403 if the probative value of the opinion is substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury. . . .
Generally, the best resolution for this problem is for the questioner to break down the legal terms into its factual elements. . . .
This question essentially asked whether Palmer met one of the elements of the statutory definition of “sexually violent predator.”
The Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) defines “sexually violent predator” as
a person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from an mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility.
Iowa Code § 229A.2(11). The definition can be broken down into three main elements: (1) commission of a “sexually violent offense,” (2) “mental abnormality,” and (3) “makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if not confined in a secure facility.” Id. In this case, there was no dispute that Palmer had committed a “sexually violent offense” and that he had a “mental abnormality” as defined by the statute. The third element of the definition was the fighting issue at trial.
The third element of the definition contains within it three statutorily defined phrases: (1)“likely to engage in predatory acts of violence,” see id. § 229A.2(4) (defining the phrase as “the person more likely than not will engage in acts of a sexually violent nature”), (2) “predatory,” see id. § 229A.2(6) (defining the term as “acts directed toward a person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization”), and (3) “sexually violent offense,” see id. § 229A.2(10) (defining the phrase as any violation of chapter 709 or various other sexually motivated offenses). . . .
Yet, upon close examination of the complete record, Palmer’s objection was that the witness was being asked to render an opinion by utilizing the statutory standard of “likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses.” We must therefore consider whether this specific ground makes the testimony sought by the question “otherwise” inadmissible. . .
[T]he statutory definition of “likely” is “more likely than not.” Iowa Code § 229A.2(4). This definition is essentially the same as the common usage of the term. . . .
However, the same rationale does not apply to the two remaining statutory terms used in the question posed to Dr. Salter, “predatory” and “sexual violent offense.” These statutorily defined terms have “a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the law different from that present in the vernacular.” . . .
Palmer’s objection did not address the State’s use of these two distinct legal terms in its question as ground for error and did not “alert[] the trial court to the principle sought to be invoked.” Id. “‘Care must be taken that the objection strike at the very heart of the infirmity.’” Id. (citation omitted). The proper objection would have been that the question called for a legal conclusion, for an opinion that was not the proper subject of expert testimony, Schilte v. Franklin Toy Trucks, 265 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Iowa 1978), or for an opinion whose probative value would be substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury, Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. More importantly, Palmer was required to identify the specific legal terms that rendered the question objectionable. We conclude the objection was insufficient to preserve error in this case.
Moreover, even assuming that error was preserved, the result would be the same because no prejudice resulted from Dr. Salter’s opinion. . . . No prejudice results from erroneous admission of evidence on an issue that is undisputed. . . .Palmer never asserted that any future acts he might commit would not meet the legal definition of “predatory” or “sexually violent offenses.” Rather, his argument was limited to challenging the likelihood that he would reoffend. Thus, the problematic part of Dr. Salter’s opinion went to what amounted to an undisputed issue in the case and resulted in no prejudice."
In other words, the prosecutor didn't ask the question correctly, but the defense counsel didn't give the right objection, and in the end it didn't hurt anything anyway, so in layman's terms, it's a push, no blood no foul, and the committal stands.
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