STATE v. WILKINS upholds the murder conviction of one of the prisoners who'd escaped earlier from Oakdale in Coralville. Wilkins was alleging two errors: 1) The Court refused his challenge for cause against a juror who worked as an overweight vehicle enforcement officer, and so had some ties with the County Attorney's office via ongoing prosecutions. 2) Prosecutorial misconduct in that the State kept referring to the defendant by his nickname of "OJ". The Court found that because the defendant removed the juror in question through a preemptory challenge, the first issue was moot:
". . . . [T]he use of a peremptory challenge to remove an allegedly prejudiced juror from the array negates any prejudice that might otherwise arise from a denial of a challenge for cause. . . . when the impartiality of a juror is questioned the focus should be limited to those jurors who actually served in the case."
The Court then found that while it was unprofessional and rather rude of the prosecutor to hammer away at the defendant's unfortunate nickname, it didn't prejudice the defendant to the extent of warranting a reversal of a conviction. Finally, the Court ordered that the defendant's claim of newly discovered evidence be preserved for postconviction relief.
The STATE v. JAMES case turns on the interpretation of the word "knowingly" in the child endangerment statute. The facts: The defendant had woken in the night with a migraine and needed to take medication for it. While up, she woke her two-year-old son, who had a propensity for escaping the confines of his room. Presumably knowing the migraine meds might knock her out, she decided to tie his door closed with a phone cord, leaving enough slack for a small gap so he could call for her if needed. She goes to sleep, the kid tries to go out the window. He's spotted, fortunately, and the people manage to wake up Mom before he kills himself falling out the window. Mom had known he was capable of trying to get a screen out if the window was open, but he'd never before been able to open the window on his own. The State charged her with child endangerment under Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a), which requires proof that she knowingly act in a manner that creates a "substantial risk to a child or minor’s physical, mental or emotional health or safety." The State argued that the words "knowingly act" only required the defendant to have a conscious awareness of her actions - that she knew she was taking the action, not necessarily what the outcome of that action would be. The defendant wanted an instruction that "knowingly act" meant she "had a conscious awareness that she was creating a substantial risk to . . . 'the child[’s] physical, mental, or emotional health or safety.'" The Court agreed with the defendant, and reversed the conviction:
"We conclude it was error for the trial court to instruct that “knowingly” refers only to the defendant’s act. The instructions should have informed the jury that it must find the defendant acted with knowledge that she was creating a substantial risk to the child’s safety."
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