STATE V. HENDRICKS caught my eye for sheer audacity. The defendant appealed his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. His grounds are rather unique: Iowa Code § 692A.2(4) indicates that “A person is not required to register while incarcerated, in foster care, or in a residential treatment program." Because the defendant hadn't been released from the Waterloo Residential Facility, but had rather just walked out and failed to return ("voluntarily absent" is the technical term), he was still "in" the program and therefore not required to register. The Court disagreed:
" In essence, Hendrick’s argument would require all covered persons released from prison or another correctional facility to register as sex offenders but would exempt from registration all covered persons who escaped or were voluntarily absent. Not only is this argument foreclosed by the plain language of chapter 692A, it (1) “strains logic,” in the words of the district court, and (2) is contrary to the evident public policy underlying chapter 692A."
STATE V. DEVERS is a challenge to a conviction based on the Court's ruling prior sexual conduct by the victim was inadmissible under the Rape Shield Law.
Facts: S.A. sneaked into her boyfriend, H.D.'s house through a basement window. They had sex. S.A. thought she left around 4:30, H.D. said it was around 1:00. Several hours after leaving H.D.’s home S.A. came into contact with the defendant, Devers, who offered her a ride. She fell asleep in Devers’s car and when she awoke they were at the Super 7 Motel in Council Bluffs, Iowa. Devers obtained a key to room 243 and the two went up to the room together and smoked marijuana. When she wanted to leave Devers “jumped on” her like he was “attacking her,” “like a football player making a tackle.” She struggled with Devers, who cut her on the right side of her face from cheekbone to jawbone. Devers forced his fingers into her vagina, telling her: “Shut up, bitch. I’m going to kill you. Be good.” Devers then forced his fingers into S.A.’s mouth and she bit him hard enough to cause a wound. In addition to her deep facial wound S.A. sustained several other injuries, including injuries to her forehead, inner thigh, knees, ankles and hand. Eventually she escaped the room and attracted the attention of Ed Van Severen, the motel maintenance man, with her screaming. Van Severen had seen Devers and S.A. pull into the motel in Devers’s car. The female he heard screaming was saying “rapist” and “I’m not going nowhere with you.” As Van Severen found the source of the screaming and was heading toward S.A., he saw Devers drive away past him in the same car Devers had arrived in. When Van Severen noticed that S.A.’s face was dripping blood he went into room 236 and called 911 for help. S.A. followed him into the room and told Van Severen that she wanted to go home and that Devers had cut her.
Issue: The defendant wanted to admit testimony S.A. had sex with H.D. because he wanted to allege that it was a possible alternative source for the bruising found on S.A.'s inner thigh, and he wanted to use the time discrepency issue to impinge on her credibility.
Ruling: "For the reasons that follow we agree with the trial court. First, there is no evidence in the record that H.D. and S.A.’s sexual activity was rough, resisted, anything other than consensual, or that any injury resulted from such activity. Second, the medical evidence in the record suggests the injuries to S.A.’s inner thigh were no more than six to eight hours old when she was examined after the assault, while her encounter with H.D. had taken place at least twelve hours prior to the alleged assault and even more time had elapsed before the injuries were treated by medical professionals. Finally, S.A. had numerous other injuries which Devers did not claim to have been caused by H.D. They included, but were not limited to, the large cut on her face upon which the State relied as the “serious injury” to charge Devers with first-degree sexual abuse. Thus, whether the injury to her inner thigh was caused by H.D. or Devers had very little relevance to any material fact at issue at trial."
Obligatory blog commentary: Yep, if you could just have explained away the bruise on the thigh, you might've gotten away. Never mind the big honking cut on her cheek. I'm sure the jury won't notice a little thing like that.
STATE V. CROMER involves a rape by lack of consent due to intoxication. The issue is whether the State had to prove the defendant was aware how intoxicated the victim was, and whether the defendant's own intoxication can be used as a defense to negate that knowledge.
Facts: The victim "consumed copious amounts of alcohol" at her cousin's wedding, and ended up talking to the defendant and his friend at a bar. Both men were also rather blasted. They offered her a ride home, she accepted. Somewhere along the line, she passes out. According to the record, "Schubick’s next memory is waking up naked on a motel bed between Cromer and Schulthies. At trial both Schubick and her mother testified as to the number of small bruises she had on her body, the lump on her forehead, and her bruised jaw." The State’s alleged that the two men had dragged her into the hotel room, disrobed her, and then preformed various sexual acts on her, as she remained “passed out”. This was corroborated by a jailhouse snitch. The defendant claimed that Schubick, "while admittedly very drunk, was nonetheless a willing participant."
Issue: Iowa Code section 709.4(1) provides a person commits sexual abuse in the third degree when they perform a sex act ”by force or against the will of the other person,” and Iowa Code section 709.4(4), provides a person commits sexual abuse in the third degree when they perform a sex act and “the act is performed while the other person is mentally incapacitated, physically incapacitated, or physically helpless.” The jury instructions on these points included these statements:
Jury Instruction 19 - The State must prove all of the following elements of Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree under Count II: 1. On or about the 29th day of March 2003, the defendant performed a sex act with Nicole Schubick. 2. The sex act was performed while Nicole Schubick was mentally incapacitated or physically helpless. Jury instruction 20 - As used in Instruction No. 19, “Mentally Incapacitated” means that a person is temporarily incapable of controlling the person’s own conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or intoxicating substance.
The defendant alleged these instructions were unconstitutional because they required no proof that the defendant was aware she was mentally incapacitated due to alcohol. The district court agreed.
Ruling: The Court of Appeals found sex abuse in the third degree by mental incapacity a strict liability crime, analogizing it to the statutory rape prohibition in the Iowa Code. It also found that
even if knowledge was required, the evidence was more than sufficient:
The fact Cromer is subject to criminal sanctions because he incorrectly assessed Schubick’s mental capacity does not render the statute unconstitutional. Id. Furthermore, Iowa Code section 709.4(4) does not require knowledge of the other person’s mental incapacitation. Compare Iowa Code § 709.4(4) with Iowa Code § 709.4(3) (requiring that a person who performs an act while the other person is under the influence of a controlled substance know or reasonably should know that the other person is under the influence of a controlled substance); see also State v. Bauer, 324 N.W.2d 320, 322 (Iowa 1982) (holding a defendant's subjective awareness of a sexual abuse victim's lack of consent is not an element of third-degree sexual abuse). Therefore, the statute did not violate Cromer’s due process rights and the jury was properly instructed on all the statutory elements.
Moreover, Cromer’s own intoxication and the result it may have had on his ability to determine Schubick’s mental capacity does not change this conclusion. Sex abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(4) is a general intent crime. See State v. Christensen, 414 N.W.2d 843, 845-46 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987). Therefore, as Cromer’s attorney acknowledged during the hearing on his motion for new trial, “one of the problems that [Cromer] had was, of course, that his intoxication is not a defense in this case.” See State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa 2000) (stating that defenses of intoxication and diminished capacity are not available on a general intent crime because these defenses negate only the specific intent element of a crime).
The standard imposed by Iowa Code section 709.4(4) is clear: to avoid the proscribed conduct Cromer should have refrained from performing a sex act with a person who is mentally incapacitated as that term is defined in Iowa Code section 709.1A(1). If he did engage in such conduct, his lack of knowledge of Schubick’s mental incapacitation caused by his intoxication is no defense. SeeState v. Tague, 310 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1981) (indicating that “statutes regarding sex offenses are common examples of employment of strict liability intended to protect the public welfare"). Moreover, even if Cromer’s subjective knowledge of Schubick’s mental incapacity was required by due process, the weight of the evidence supports a jury conclusion that Cromer knew of Schubick’s mental incapacitation, as evidence indicated she was dragged into the hotel room and was unconscious throughout the entire incident. Consequently we conclude the district court erred in determining the jury instructions violated Cromer’s due process rights. We reverse the ruling on the motion for new trial and remand for entry of a judgment of conviction.
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