FACTS
A class action suit brought by the Sanchez family, a John and Jane Doe, etc., to determine whether the Iowa DOT interpretation of Iowa Code Section 321.196 violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, article I, sections 6 and 22 of the Iowa Constitution, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and 18 U.S.C. § 242, by denying driver's licenses to illegal immigrants. According to the opinion:
Section 321.196 is the provision governing renewal of existing licenses. It presupposes that a licensee seeking renewal of a license previously qualified for and obtained a license. The statute does not allow, let alone “command,” the DOT to issue licenses to anyone who does not meet the requirements of section 321.182.
Moreover, the Sanchez class has not followed the procedures established by the DOT to obtain a waiver of the social security number requirement. The DOT has adopted the following procedure for waiver:
If you are a temporary foreign national who is not authorized for employment, the DOT may waive the Social Security Number requirement for a non-commercial driver’s license or identification card. However, you must present your immigration documents so that the DOT can record the BCIS (INS) number in lieu of the Social Security Number.
Iowa Dep’t of Transp., Verification of Social Security Number for an Iowa Driver’s License or ID Card, at http://www.iamvd.com/ods/ssn.htm (last updated Feb. 25, 2004) (emphasis added).
ANALYSIS
The class first challenged the refusal to provide licenses to illegal aliens under the federal and state Equal Protection Clauses. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution provides: “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” They originally argued the Court should apply strict scrutiny, but apparently conceded at oral arguments that that no suspect class or fundamental right was at issue in this case, so rational basis was the appropriate level of scrutiny.
The State indicated four interests served by the challenged statute:
(1) “not allowing its governmental machinery to be a facilitator for the concealment of illegal aliens,” Doe v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2001);
(2) “limiting its services to citizens and legal residents,” id.;
(3) “restricting [Iowa] driver’s licenses to those who are citizens or legal residents because of the concern that persons subject to immediate deportation will not be financially responsible for property damage or personal injury due to automobile accidents,” id.; and
(4) discouragement of illegal immigration.
With respect to the first state interest, the class argued that giving illegal aliens driver’s licenses will not necessarily facilitate their concealment because the DOT could make the licenses identify the holder’s status as an illegal alien. Not that the proffered state interest is not legitimate, but that the statute is not narrowly tailored. The Court disagreed, indicating that the legislature is not required to employ the best means of achieving a legitimate state interest, just to have reasonably believed that the means chosen would promote the purpose, therefore there was a reasonable basis for the law under the first stated purpose. Because the class failed to carry their burden of negating all reasonable bases that could justify the challenged statute, the Court did not address the legitimacy of the other state interests.
The class made an alternative argument under the substantive due process clauses of the Iowa and United States constitutions. The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Article I of the Iowa Constitution provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Substantive due process is the legal term for the concept that these clauses provide “‘heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.’” If the liberty interest at issue is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies. If not, the challenged statute passes if it can satisfy the rational-basis test.
The class again had to concede that the right to a driver's license has been consistently held not to be a "fundamental right" like the right to marry, etc. The Court therefore upheld the statute under the rational-basis test for the same reasons discussed in the equal protection analysis.
The class then tried a collateral argument that the statued violated article 1, section 22 of the Iowa Constitution, which provides:
Foreigners who are, or may hereafter become residents of this state, shall enjoy the same rights in respect to the possession, enjoyment and descent of property, as native born citizens.
The thought was apparently to make a claim that a driver’s license is “property” - but the class failed to expand on that part of the claim in the brief or to address any specific application of the language of section 22, so the Court deemed the argument waived.
The Court also found that because the statute did not violate the class's constitutional rights, it had no cause of action under USC Sections 1983 (providing liability in tort for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws) or 1981 (providing liability in tort for discrimination; co-extensive with the Equal Protection Clause). It also held 18 U.S.C. § 242 inapplicable, because is a criminal statute, granting no private right of action.
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On a side note, Christy v. Miulli is a med mal wrongful death claim, which draws a distinction between the two doctrines of fraudulent concealment: 1) The quasi-discovery rule doctrine, which tolls the statute of limitations for malpractice until the injured party discovers or by the exercise of diligence could have discovered the cause of action; and 2) the equitable estoppel doctrine, which prohibits a litigant from raising the issue of statute of limitations if the other party can show that the litigant's conduct amounted to false representation or concealment, and that by relying thereon the party was misled into doing or failing to do something that party would not otherwise have done or omitted. It was important, because the first line of cases required a showing that the doctor concealed the injury they caused, not just covered up negligence. In this case, the patient died, so it would've been a tad hard to hide that. But the surviving spouse had not been aware that the decedent had died a brain hemhorrage that had occurred at the site the doctor had performed a biopsy on the wrong part of the brain. The doctor had intentionally concealed that there was a physician error, not whether there was an injury. The Court found the surviving spouse could sue because the defendant doctor and his direct supervisor Miulli were unable to raise the statute of limitations defense due to the equitable estoppel fraudulent concealment rule.
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