The Supreme Court ruled today that Michael Newdow had no standing to challenge his daughter's exposure to the pledge of allegiance in school, as he didn't have custody of the girl. Her mother, who did have primary custody, did not object to the pledge - quite the opposite, she actively campaigned against Newdow's suit in the media.



I had believed something like this would happen. The Court never wants to decide on the merits if they have a nice procedural dismissal available - the less they can mess with the document the better, in essence. The text of the opinion is not yet up on the Supreme Court website, but I snagged a copy from SCOTUSblog, which you can read here. (Way to get that early text out there!)



For anyone who'd prefer not to wade through the whole thing, I've pulled the key quotes, which are as follows (No, this isn't short - but at least it isn't 15 pages):



"Sandra Banning, the mother of Newdow's daughter, filed a motion for leave to intervene, or alternatively to dismiss the complaint. App. 82. She declared that although she and Newdow shared physical custody of their daughter, a state-court order granted her exclusive legal custody of the child, including the sole right to represent [the daughter's legal interests and make all decision[s] about her education and welfare. . . Banning further stated that her daughter is a Christian who believes in God and has no objection either to reciting or hearing others recite the Pledge of Allegiance, or to its reference to God. . . .



The command to guard jealously and exercise rarely our power to make constitutional pronouncements requires strictest adherence when matters of great national signifi cance are at stake. Even in cases concededly within our jurisdiction under Article III, we abide by a series of rules under which [we have] avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon [us] for decision. . .



One of the principal areas in which this Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of domestic relations. Long ago we observed that ih[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States. In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593 594 (1890). . .



This case concerns not merely Newdow's interest in inculcating his child with his views on religion, but also the rights of the child's mother as a parent generally and under the Superior Court orders specifically. And most important, it implicates the interests of a young child who finds herself at the center of a highly public debate over her custody, the propriety of a widespread national ritual, and the meaning of our Constitution. The interests of the affected persons in this case are in many respects antagonistic. Of course, legal disharmony in family relations is not uncommon, and in many in stances that disharmony poses no bar to federal-court adjudication of proper federal questions. What makes this case different is that Newdow's standing derives entirely from his relationship with his daughter, but he lacks the right to litigate as her next friend. . . .



Court of Appeals, which possesses greater familiarity with California law, concluded that state law vests in Newdow a cognizable right to influence his daughter's religious upbringing. . . The court based its ruling on two intermediate state appellate cases holding that while the custodial parent undoubtedly has the right to make ultimate decisions concerning the child's religious upbringing, a court will not enjoin the noncustodial parent from discussing religion with the child or involving the child in his or her religious activities in the absence of a showing that the child will be thereby harmed. . . .



Nothing that either Banning or the School Board has done, however, impairs Newdow's right to instruct his daughter in his religious views. Instead, Newdow . . . wishes to forestall his daughter's exposure to religious ideas that her mother, who wields a form of veto power, endorses, and to use his parental status to challenge the influences to which his daughter may be exposed in school when he and Banning disagree. The California cases simply do not stand for the proposition that Newdow has a right to dictate to others what they may and may not say to his child respecting religion. . .



In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiff's claimed standing. When hard questions of domestic relations are

sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law. There is a vast difference between Newdow's right to communicate with his child - which both California law and the First Amendment recognize - and his claimed right to shield his daughter from influences to which she is exposed in school despite the terms of the custody order. We conclude that, having been deprived under California law of the right to sue as next friend, Newdow lacks prudential standing to bring this suit in federal court."





UPDATE:



Eugene Volokh has the law professor's view of the outcome:



"Great! One less case that I have to try to edit down to a manageable size for the textbook supplement that I have due in a few weeks."