The new decisions of the Iowa Court of Appeals are up.



In skimming them this morning, a case involving a sentencing issue caught my eye, possibly because the judge doing the sentencing, Mike Moon, practiced in Marshalltown where I used to prosecute. He’s an excellent judge, but in this case didn’t make enough of a record regarding his reasons for sending the defendant to prison, according to the Court of Appeals.



STATE V. JOY - full decision here.

THE FACTS

Brienne Joy had been drinking cognac and beer in the Tama casino when she thought it would be fun to go for a drive with her two-year-old daughter in the snow and ice. She lost control of her car while going around a curve, and the car left the roadway and struck a telephone pole. Tyra was thrown from her car seat and suffered a fractured skull and a collapsed lung. She was airlifted to the hospital, placed on a ventilator, and remained in intensive care for over a week. A blood test at the time of the accident showed Joy had a .109 alcohol concentration. She was charged with child endangerment resulting in serious injury (Count I), child endangerment resulting in bodily injury (Count II), operating while intoxicated (OWI) first offense (Count III), serious injury by vehicle (Count IV), and driving while barred

(Count V).



THE PLEA DEAL

Joy entered into a plea agreement with the State wherein she would enter guilty pleas to the child endangerment resulting in bodily injury, the OWI first offense, and the serious injury by vehicle charge. The State agreed to drop the remaining charges, and to recommend probation rather than jail, with any sentences on the three counts to run concurrently. The state was to recommend placement in a residential correction facility. (Incidentally, these were the recommendations of the pre-sentence investigation (PSI) made by the department of corrections, so it is possible that the agreement was simply to concur with the recommendations in the PSI. It’s a common enough plea proposal, as the Court generally goes along with the PSI anyway). Joy entered her guilty pleas pursuant to the plea agreement, and the court accepted her pleas.



THE SENTENCING

The sentencing court, however, did not agree with the recommendations by the State and in the PSI report. (NOTE: The Court is not bound by any recommendations made by the State as part of a plea deal. Pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10 (3) and (4) the Judge is supposed to indicate to the defendant at the time of the plea whether the Court will agree to be bound by the plea agreement or not, and afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea or decide to take their chances). Judge Moon said:



"Miss Joy, one of the things that you have the unfortunate or dubious distinction of running into today is a judge who has absolutely no tolerance for people who endanger the lives of their children. I absolutely abhor it. There is no excuse for it. I don’t care what your problems are, you do not endanger the lives of children. They have no choice. They have absolutely no choice in the matter. So, I’m not going to put you on probation. I’m going to send you to prison. I’m going to tell you that right now. You’re going today."



The defendant then appealed the sentence based on the allegation that Judge Moon didn’t take into account any of the factors required by Iowa law other than the nature of the crime she committed. The Court of Appeals examined what Iowa law requires be considered in sentencing a defendant:



"When a sentence is not mandatory, the district court must exercise its discretion in determining what sentence to impose. The district court must demonstrate its exercise of discretion by stating upon the record the reasons for the particular sentence imposed. The sentencing court, however, is generally not required to give its reasons for rejecting particular sentencing options. State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996) . . the sentencing court . . . should weigh and consider all pertinent matters in determining proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant's age, character and propensities and chances of his reform. The courts owe a duty to the public as much as to defendant in determining a proper sentence. The punishment should fit both the crime and the individual."



The Court of Appeals found that Judge Moon had made no other record other than the paragraph listed above, and decided that wasn’t sufficient to show he’d taken into account Ms. Joy’s age, character, etc.



THE RULING

"Based on our review of the entire record, including the transcript of the sentencing hearing and the written sentencing order, we conclude the sentencing court relied solely on the nature of the offenses in making its sentencing determination. The above quoted statement from the sentencing hearing was the only reason offered by the court for the sentences imposed. This statement of reasons relies only on the nature of the offenses (i.e. that of endangering a child.) In the written order the court merely states that a suspended sentence with probation was not warranted based on the factors considered, and the reasons given, on the “verbatim record.” However, as set forth above, the “verbatim record” from the sentencing hearing shows only the consideration of one factor, the nature of the offenses. The written order does not demonstrate consideration of any of the other “minimal essential factors.” The nature of the offenses may of course be considered, and we do not suggest what appropriate sentences should be."



Note that last sentence. That’s a huge hint that Judge Moon can resentence Joy to prison if he likes, so long as he considers her age, character, propensity to crime, and so on. In the Iowa Courts Online website, it indicates she was born in 1980, which makes her 23. Other than the case at hand, the website indicates she’s pled guilty to the following:



FAILURE TO HAVE VALID LICENSE/PERMIT WHILE OPER. MOTOR VEH 1998

FAILURE TO HAVE VALID LICENSE/PERMIT WHILE OPER. MOTOR VEH. 1999

VIOLATION - FINANCIAL LIABILITY COVERAGE 1999

DRIVING WHILE LICENSE DENIED,SUSP,CANCELLED 1999

FAIL TO MAINTAIN SAFETY BELTS 1999

DRIVING WHILE LICENSE DENIED,SUSP,CANCELLED 1999

DRIVING WHILE LICENSE DENIED,SUSP,CANCELLED 2001

VIOLATION - FINANCIAL LIABILITY COVERAGE 2001

CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 5TH DEGREE (SMMS) 2002

DRIVING WHILE LICENSE DENIED,SUSP,CANCELLED 2002

CHILD ENDANGERMENT 2002

VIOLATION - FINANCIAL LIABILITY COVERAGE 2002

OPERATION W/O REGISTRATION 2002

FAILURE TO SECURE CHILD 2002



I’d think she may be facing a similar sentence when the case is remanded back to Judge Moon. The Magic 8 Ball says “As I see it, yes.”