In the Interest of FB and TB involves a termination of parental rights of a woman with, among other problems, bi-polar disorder. One of her primary allegations was that she was wrongfully denied a guardian ad litem to help her sort out the case plan and legal issues. Unfortunately for her, the Court notes that she was fully represented by an attorney, seemed oriented enough to comprehend the legal issues at the termination hearing, and didn't even request the GAL until after the termination was well underway, despite having about 10 months to do so. The dissent, however, would've liked a closer look at the issue, based on the ADA: "I disagree with the majority’s decision to file an opinion in this case without the benefit of full briefing. Cassandra suffers from a bipolar disorder which handicaps her in her ability both to understand the legal process and parent her children. She makes claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and further contends the State did not recognize and accommodate her disability in supplying those services required as a part of the reasonable efforts the State is required to make to preserve a family. See Iowa Code § 232.102 (2005). These are areas where prior cases provide little direction and I find the limited briefing hinders my review of these issues." It sounds like that's an issue that might come up in the future, given the wide range of problems that can be covered under ADA protection.
State v. Allen reiterates the idea that the state is strictly held to charging a person under the correct code sections. Angela Allen pled guilty to introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility in violation of 719.8, and possession of a controlled substance in a correctional institution in violation of section 719.7, both Class D felonies. The district court sentenced Allen to five-year indeterminate terms on each count, to be served consecutively. The problem: she'd brought the pot into Fort Dodge Correctional Facility. There are two statutes covering drugs in jails, prisons, and so forth: 719.7 prohibits controlled substances and intoxicating beverages into correctional institutions or institutions under the management of the department of corrections, and 719.8 prohibits the same items in detention facilities. Fort Dodge is a correctional institution, not a detention facility. The State tried to argue it's basically the same thing, and to overturn the conviction would frustrate the legislature's purpose. The Court disagreed: "With this background in mind, we conclude “correctional institution or institution under the management of the department of corrections” and “detention facility” are mutually exclusive terms. . . . By providing a statute for each, the legislature made a decision to treat detention facilities separately from correctional institutions and institutions under the control of the Department of Corrections. It is impermissible for this court to interfere with this decision “under the guise of construction,” . . . Finally, we do not think this conclusion leads to an absurd result . . . or frustrates the objects the legislature sought to accomplish . . . [r]ather, we conclude the two statutes target two similar but distinct harms. We must honor that distinction."
State v. Matlock dealt with the admission of other bad acts used to show intent, and prosecutorial misconduct. Matlock had been charged with willful injury and going armed with intent, both while being a habitual offender, after a confrontation in which he sliced the victim's face with a boxcutter. Matlock admitted the assault, but claimed he was acting in self-defense. Regarding the other bad acts issue, the Court found that evidence that Matlock had inflicted a 7" cut another man with some sharp instrument 11 days before the assault on this victim, and given yet a third guy a slice that required 18 stitches and surgery on the very same day, were both admissible to show the specific intent required by both the willful injury and going armed with intent charges: "Evidence of Matlock’s other intentional violent acts makes it more probable that his actions in this case were the product of intentional, voluntary decisions to inflict serious injury upon Riley. The fact that Matlock, in a short span of time, violently attacked two other individuals in a manner similar to his attack on Riley, raises a reasonable inference that his actions in this case were the product of specific intent rather than non-culpable justification. Because Matlock’s other bad acts were relevant proof of his intent to commit the offenses charged, and negated his claim of self-defense, the district court correctly concluded the exclusionary provisions of rule 5.404(b) did not apply." The prosecutorial misconduct appeared to be a closer call, the opinion shading the distinction between arguing that the jury can decide the testimony of the defendant was not believeable, and outright calling the defendant a liar. The appeal on this issue was technically for ineffective assistance of counsel, in that Matlock's attorney failed to object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Court found that the prosecutor's actions weren't clearly misconduct, and the failure to object to them didn't prejudice Matlock's case:
Matlock complains about a number of statements made by the prosecutor during the State’s closing argument. He argues the prosecutor improperly called him a liar, without actually saying the word “liar.” He also asserts the prosecutor’s remarks were demeaning and inflammatory. The prosecutor did suggest that Matlock’s testimony was not believable, stated that Matlock’s version of events was not “the truth” and was “ridiculous,” and at one point equated the possibility that certain of Matlock’s claims were true with the possibility that pigs will one day fly. Most of these comments were made in the context of the prosecutor’s review of the evidence, and her assertions as to what the evidence reasonably showed.
A prosecutor is entitled to some latitude during closing arguments in analyzing the evidence admitted at trial.” Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 874. While it is improper for a prosecutor to call the defendant a liar, a prosecutor is free to craft an argument that includes reasonable inferences based on the evidence. Id. at 876. Additionally, when a case turns on which of two conflicting stories is true, a prosecutor is allowed to argue certain testimony is not believable. Id.
Although some of the prosecutor’s statements were certainly inadvisable, and arguably inflammatory, in light of the foregoing standards we are not convinced they are tantamount to misconduct. We need not reach the question, however, as even if some of the prosecutor’s remarks constituted misconduct, we find Matlock has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by his counsel not objecting to the prosecutor’s statements. The misconduct Matlock complains about only occurred during closing arguments; it was not pervasive throughout the trial. We also note that the prosecutor never actually called Matlock a “liar.” She merely argued that his testimony should not be believed. Furthermore, the State’s evidence was strong in this case. Matlock admitted he attacked Riley, and his claim of self-defense was made less believable by the introduction of his other bad acts. Finally, although a curative instruction was not given, the jury was instructed that the arguments of counsel should not be considered evidence.
We conclude that Matlock failed to prove he was prejudiced by his counsel’s actions to such an extent that he was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, we reject his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Benson v. Iowa District Court for Benton County is a nasty divorce case in which Benson was found to have been in contempt of court. Apparently, the guy drained his $65,000 401K account just prior to the trial. His ex claimed that he then came into court and testified at trial that the account was still intact. After the trial, when it came time to sell the family home as ordered by the court, Benson wouldn't answer the agent’s telephone calls, failed to sign listing documents, threatened the agent with legal action, and impeded her access to the house. Meanwhile, the court had ordered that he be responsible for making mortgage payments in the interim. He didn't do it. Benson claimed he couldn't make the payments because he was unemployed, and she hadn't given him a cash payment she was supposed to have made. Yet, he did manage to make a $25,000 cash payment on his credit card, though the minimum payment on the card was about $670. Finally, Benson was supposed to give his ex several items that were clearly listed on an exhibit incorporated into the decree. He wouldn't give them over, or allow her access to the house to get them. He claimed that the decree awarding her the items violated due process because it didn't set a time limit for him to give them over. The district court found Benson in contempt on all these counts, and sentenced him to 30 days in jail on each of these four issues, to be served consecutively. The Court of Appeals upheld all but one of these - it struck down the lying under oath on the 401K issue because it couldn't anywhere in the transcript where he said it was still intact. So it seems Mr. Benson is only going to jail for 90 days, not 120.
There are numerous other cases, so check out the court's website if you want to know what else went on.
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