Every now and again one catches my eye more for the facts than the legal analysis. State v. Bellville affirms the defendant's conviction and sentence, despite the trial court's failure to articulate additional reasons for the term of imprisonment imposed beyond the fact it conformed to the plea agreement: "The court must provide specific reasoning regarding why consecutive sentences are warranted in the particular case. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000). However, where the sentencing court is merely giving effect to the parties’ agreement a failure to state reasons for the sentence imposed is not reversible error." Why is the defendant so upset about the court imposing a sentence he agreed to? Well, he can't say he wasn't warned:
On October 7, 2002, authorities investigating a complaint of a suspicious vehicle near Round Lake in Mondamin stopped Bellville’s vehicle. Bellville was a passenger in the vehicle. Officers smelled the odor of anhydrous ammonia coming from the vehicle. A search of the occupants and the vehicle resulted in the discovery of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine, anhydrous ammonia in a thermos, lithium batteries, pseudoephedrine, Coleman fuel, plastic tubing, glass and plastic containers, and numerous other items associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine.
Based on this incident, the State charged Bellville with twelve drug offenses.[1] He appeared before the district court in December of 2002 and entered guilty pleas to nine of the original twelve charges.[2] Bellville’s guilty pleas were part of an agreement to transfer him to drug court. When Bellville pled guilty, the district court informed him that if he successfully completed the drug court program, all of the charges against him would be dismissed. He was also informed that if he did not successfully complete the program, he would be sentenced to consecutive prison terms. The court accepted Bellville’s pleas of guilty and ordered him into treatment as part of the drug court program.
On August 2, 2003, Bellville violated the terms of his probation. Bellville admitted the violation, and on August 28, 2003, the court sentenced him to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling fifty-two years. In January 2004 the sentencing judge gave Bellville another chance. The court reconsidered Bellville’s sentence and returned him to probation under the drug court program.
Bellville violated his probation again in October 2004. He admitted the violation, and the court re-imposed consecutive prison terms totaling fifty-two years.
State v. Colbert rejects the "close enough for government work" concept of restitution.
State v. Poynter deals with the probative/prejudicial line on evidence of other bad acts. During his assault trial, the defendant made a statement on the stand that he wished he could have contacted a certain witness, who would confirm his version of events. He told the court that he was unable to contact the witness because he'd been in jail. The prosecutor and defense counsel argued a bit off the record, and then the State asked: “And I don’t want you to tell me what other charges, but you are being held on other charges in the Black Hawk County jail besides this, aren’t you?” Poynter answered, “Yes, ma’am.” The defendant alleged that was prejudicial and reversible error. The state argued the defendant opened the door to the question, which was necessary to correct any misimpression by the jury that the defendant had been in jail the whole time on the charge at hand, and any temptation toward an acquittal based on the idea the defendant had been punished enough. The Court found the statements inadmissible, but the other evidence against the defendant was too strong to show a reasonable probability that the trial would have ended with a different result had the challenged question and answer not been published to the jury. However, the court then strikes down the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court: "The district court’s sentencing order states in pertinent part:'The sentence adjudged in this case was found to be appropriate by the court following full and fair consideration of the plea agreement between the parties; sentencing goals and objectives; and defendant’s prior criminal record.' Here, there was no plea agreement. Poynter was found guilty following a jury trial. We conclude the district court failed to provide sufficient reasons for imposing consecutive sentences." D'oh.
State v. Kunde involved a first-degree arson conviction. The defendant's appeal alleged there was insufficient evidence to show that he knew, or could reasonably have anticipated, that someone was inside the structure at the time he started the fire. The Court's response: the evidence that there were witnesses he saw the victim at the cabin, and the testimony of a witness who'd told him the victim was back in town, combined with the testimony of the victim that he saw Kunde's truck drive by two or three times that day, was sufficient.
State v. Hoskins involves a search based on a confidential informant's tip: The information the informant gave police was that (1) Hoskins was in a bar; (2) his vehicle was parked outside; and (3) he had cocaine on his person. When Hoskins left the bar with a passenger, the officers followed, stopping him after they saw him drive through a red light. Hoskins consented to a search of his person. At that time, Hoskins was not under arrest, and officers had neither found contraband on him nor seen any inside the vehicle. Hoskins refused to allow a search of his vehicle. Because a K-9 unit was temporarily unavailable, the officers proceeded with a search of Hoskins’s vehicle. The Court found the search improper:
The informant’s statement to Sergeant Meyer is largely conclusory. The informant gave the police no information, innocuous or otherwise, that they could use to corroborate the reliability of this particular tip. . . .
It is clear from the record the informant gave no specific details about the cocaine. It is also clear the informant never advised police that he observed Hoskins selling the drugs. We have already concluded above that the initial stop of Hoskins’s vehicle was proper. Thus, the crucial issue before us is whether the warrantless search of Hoskins’s vehicle was supported by probable cause. The only information corroborated by law enforcement prior to the search of Hoskins’s vehicle was that (1) he was present at the Uptown Lounge and (2) his vehicle was parked outside. There was no independent corroboration of Hoskins’s possession of cocaine because the officers never entered the bar. Following the traffic stop, Hoskins was searched and no drugs were located on his person, in contravention of what the informant told Sergeant Meyer. . . .
We conclude there was insufficient probable cause to uphold the search of Hoskins’s vehicle.
State v. Polk concerned another sentencing issue. During the sentencing hearing, the Court noted the following:
The other factors that concern me greatly is number one, you were in possession of a social security card, a MasterCard and Shazam card from the John Deere Community Credit Union in the name of another individual, Kevin Dale Cameron. I don’t know how you came to be in possession of Mr. Cameron’s identity card and his credit card and his Shazam card, but I do find it somewhat coincidental that you were in the line at the John Deere Community Credit Union where those things were from. If you have some information to shed some light on it, I would certainly be interested in it.
And, nonetheless, I’m certainly not making a finding that you have committed another criminal offense in that regard; but those are factors I find to be somewhat aggravating and circumstantially suspect. You were also in possession and [sic] a check for Iris Wright. I don’t know how you came to be in possession of those things. No explanation was submitted in regards to that.
You were also in possession of a straightedge razor. That, for somebody who had just been released from completing another sentence, is very disconcerting to me, particularly when it’s combined with the fact that you have stated that this was a crime of opportunity. It was an impulsive thing.
None of those factors speak well in your behalf, Mr. Polk; and I think that the 15-year sentence is an appropriate sentence.
The problem: Not only was there no explanation for these items, none of them had actually been charged as crimes. It was pretty obvious that the trial court had relied on this at least in part, so the case was remanded for resentencing. As a side not, the defendant apparently did this one pro se.
Other stuff: speedy trial rules, sufficiency of the evidence on conspiracy to manufacture meth and possession of precursors convictions, an appeal of a defense verdict in a med mal case, work comp and permanent partial disability, statute of limitations and the discovery rule, and a bunch of juvenile cases.
