Facts:
"In the wee hours of April 20, 2003, a Cerro Gordo County deputy sheriff clocked a car speeding on a highway in Mason City. The deputy gave chase but the car did not immediately stop. The car swerved over the center line twice before eventually coming to a halt on the wrong side of an adjacent residential street.
The deputy spoke to the driver, Joshua Paul Moorehead. Moorehead was eighteen years old, living at home with his parents, and driving his mother’s car. The deputy smelled alcohol and noticed Moorehead’s speech was slurred. Moorehead’s eyes were glazed but not bloodshot. Moorehead initially denied having anything to drink, but later admitted he had drunk one beer.
The deputy administered three field sobriety tests for drunkenness. Moorehead failed them all. While taking one of these tests, Moorehead said he did not know if he could pass the test “if I was sober.” The deputy also asked Moorehead to take a preliminary breath test, and Moorehead complied. Based upon his observations, the deputy placed Moorehead in the deputy’s vehicle.
While Moorehead was sitting in the back of the police car, the deputy and Moorehead had the following videotaped conversation:
DEPUTY: Well, Josh, you’ve been drinking a lot more than one beer tonight. By all the tests that I’ve done, you’re definitely over the legal limit. . . . I’m going to have to take you with me [to the police station] to do one more test.
MOOREHEAD: That’s fine, sir.
DEPUTY: What do you want done with the car?
MOOREHEAD: Um . . . .
DEPUTY: Do you [have] some parents that can get it or anything? That can come get you after awhile?
(In an inaudible portion of the tape, at this point Moorehead presumably indicates the deputy should contact his mother.)
MOOREHEAD: Would it be possible for me to talk to my Mom when you call her to come pick it up?
DEPUTY: Not right now, because I just have to call my dispatcher and have her call her.
MOOREHEAD: All right, that’s fine . . . .
DEPUTY: I’ll probably have to wait here until she comes anyway . . . .
MOOREHEAD: Yeah, that’s fine.
The deputy contacted his dispatcher. The dispatcher called Moorehead’s parents.
Moorehead’s parents arrived at the scene of their son’s detention. Moorehead’s mother asked the deputy if she could speak with her son. The deputy told her he had to take Moorehead to the police station first and the dispatcher would call her when she could pick him up.
By all accounts, however, Moorehead’s mother did have a brief encounter with her son at the scene through the window of the patrol car. (It is unclear from the record whether the window was up or down.) For approximately thirty seconds to one minute, Moorehead’s mother yelled at her son. She told Moorehead he was grounded, and would remain grounded for a long period of time. Moorehead’s father said his wife “wasn’t very happy” and “kind of chewed on him a little bit.” Moorehead testified his exchange with his mother was not a “conversation,” just his mom yelling at him through a closed window. Moorehead did not get in a word. Moorehead’s parents took the car home and waited for a call from the police.
The deputy took Moorehead to the police station. The deputy read Moorehead the Miranda warnings and the implied consent advisory. Moorehead asked the deputy whether he should take the breath test. The deputy replied it was entirely Moorehead’s decision to make. Moorehead never asked to call his mother again, or, for that matter, anyone else. Moorehead testified he still wanted to speak to his mother but did not ask to do so again because he had already asked and therefore assumed the deputy would tell him when he could do so. Moorehead took the breath test and blew a .182.
After the test, the deputy gave Moorehead a list of written questions. On the questionnaire Moorehead admitted he had drunk not one, but three cans of Busch Light—“the only kind of beer I touch.” Bizarrely, he also indicated he wished he had a glass eye and diabetes.
While filling out the questionnaire Moorehead stood up. The deputy asked Moorehead if he was okay. Moorehead replied “I’m drunk as hell.”
So, of course, the first thought on reading this: "Dude, you are so totally busted." Not only that, but he got cussed out by his mom while sitting in the squad car. And grounded. I guess he won't ge getting that glass eye for his birthday (WTF is up with that?). But, as it turns out, it's a bit more complicated.
Issue:
"Mother knows best. While detained in the back of a patrol car on suspicion of drunk driving, a young man asked the police if he could talk to his mother about his predicament. He now asks us to overturn his conviction because the police did not comply with his request."
Okay, he's a legal adult. And he didn't exactly ask to talk to his mother "about his predicament," he wanted to ask her to get the car. And, actually, he did get to talk to her. If he got a word in edgewise. But . . . Iowa statutes include the right to speak to a relative in the same law as the right to speak to an attorney:
Iowa Code § 804.20: Any peace officer . . . having custody of any person arrested or restrained of the person’s liberty for any reason whatever, shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member of the person’s family or an attorney of the person’s choice, or both. . . . If such person is intoxicated, or a person under eighteen years of age, the call may be made by the person having custody . . . . A violation of this section shall constitute a simple misdemeanor.
Rulings:
"We conclude Moorehead’s request was properly timed. Moorehead was “restrained of [his] liberty” as he sat in the back of the patrol car. . . .
The State argued . . . Moorehead’s request to talk to his mother was not an unequivocal request to ask his mother for advice about his predicament, but instead an inquiry about what to do with the car. Lacking a clear request to seek advice, the State submitted Moorehead needed to ask for his mother again at the police station if he wanted to invoke the statute. . . . In analyzing the sufficiency of Moorehead’s request, we apply “an objective consideration of the statements and conduct of the arrestee and peace officer, as well as the surrounding circumstances.” . . . Although Moorehead’s request to talk to his mother arose in the context of a discussion about the disposition of his mother’s car, Moorehead specifically, separately, and unequivocally requested to talk to his mother. Moorehead’s request was sufficient to invoke the statute. As a consequence, the police were obligated to honor Moorehead’s request “without unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention,” in this case the police station. Iowa Code § 804.20. Because the police did not do so, they violated Moorehead’s statutory right to contact a family member."
As far as his mom yelling at him qualifying as "contact", the Court noted in a footnote:
"We are not asked to decide whether the yelling incident preempted law enforcement’s obligation to permit Moorehead to talk with his mother after arriving at the police station. We note, however, that this is not a case where the police undertook measures to put the defendant in contact with a family member only to have the family member yell, hang up, or otherwise refuse to give advice and comfort."
It doesn't stop there. Remember the admission the defendant made - "I'm drunk as hell?" It is potentially excluded. The Court quotes another case in applying the exclusionary rule to family phone calls:
"'We believe the right, given by section 804.20, to communicate with a family member is neither more nor less qualified than the right given to communicate with an attorney. We know of no reason why the exclusionary rule should be applied to a violation of one right and not to that of the other. The trial court was right in suppressing the evidence.' . . . the State argues suppression of Moorehead’s incriminating statement is not appropriate in this case because the deputy read Moorehead his Miranda rights before he confessed he was “drunk as hell” and argues these warnings should rectify any concerns about the voluntariness of his statement. Miranda warnings, however, do not address the right to contact a family member. We reiterate the right to contact a family member under section 804.20 is neither more nor less qualified than the right to contact an attorney."
The only shot the State has of getting it in?
"On remand, the district court shall decide whether the “I’m drunk as hell” statement was spontaneous. If the court finds it was spontaneous, the statement should be admitted into evidence because the exclusion of such statements is not implicated by a violation of Iowa Code section 804.20. If the court finds it was not spontaneous, the statement should be suppressed because it was obtained after “unnecessary delay”—in this case after a breath test was administered."
Ooookay. Of course, the State still has all the stuff before he asked to call his mom, and can use it on a retrial. Including the statement he couldn't pass one of the field sobriety tests (let me guess, the 30-second one-leg stand?) "if he was sober."
There was a dissent in the case, joined by Justices Ternus and Carter:
"I concur in the decision to suppress the results of defendant’s breath test . . . I dissent from that portion of the opinion that extends the suppression remedy applied to chemical test results . . . to matters of custodial interrogation. The constitutional protections afforded to persons in police custody provide an adequate safeguard against improper police interrogation. Consequently, the circumstances do not warrant the additional remedy that the court now derives from Iowa statutory law in the absence of a clear indication that the legislature intended that result."
They provide further clarification in a footnote:
"The majority of the court is incorrect in suggesting that it would be inconsistent to provide a suppression-of-evidence remedy for violations of the statute when chemical testing is involved and failing to provide such a remedy with respect to interrogation. There would be no inconsistency in doing that. Although the constitutional protections, including Miranda warnings, give adequate protection against unwarranted police interrogation, those safeguards are of little assistance to an arrested party with regard to the decision that must be made with respect to chemical testing. Denial of the statutory right to outside assistance in making the latter decision may only be vindicated by suppression of the test results."
My two cents: On first blush at least, I agree with the majority, based on their review of the history of the statute:
"By its terms, Iowa Code section 804.20 does not include an exclusionary rule. Instead, violation of the statute is a simple misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 804.20. In an early case interpreting section 804.20, we simply read the statute as written and declined to create an exclusionary rule in the absence of a legislative directive to do so. See State v. Heisdorffer, 164 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Iowa 1969). . . Our decision in that early case is consistent with the general rule, recognized in our cases, that application of an exclusionary rule is ordinarily only warranted if explicitly expressed in the statute. . . . Iowa Code section 804.20 was enacted in 1959 and thus predates much of the modern federal exclusionary rule jurisprudence. More than twenty-five years ago we changed course and overruled Heisdorffer . . . In State v. Vietor Our holding in Vietor may be reconciled with the general presumption against implied statutory exclusionary rules on the theory that an exclusionary rule is warranted for violations of those statutes, including section 804.20, which involve fundamental rights or have constitutional overtones."
Okay, and the legislature's had 25 years to correct them if that was the wrong tactic to take. Based on the deafening silence from that branch of our government, I'd say that an exclusionary rule can be inferred. I don't see the point in having a bifurcated exclusionary rule that disallows chemical test results but allows in-custody interrogative statements if contact with a family member has been withheld. If it's a violation of a fundamental right, evidence obtained from it is excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. No exceptions. I understand the facts of the case and the Miranda warning given seemed to the dissent to "give adequate protection against unwarranted police interrogation" to this particular defendant. But I think the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to be harsh enough as to ensure that officers have zero incentive to violate fundamental rights, period. If they want to fix the procedure, they could put a phrase into the Iowa Mirandas that adds "or a family member" to the right to contact an attorney. Since the right's been around for that many years, I'm not sure why they haven't done so already.
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